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portada General Creighton Abrams and the Operational Approach of Attrition in the Vietnam War
Type
Physical Book
Language
Inglés
Pages
56
Format
Paperback
Dimensions
28.0 x 21.6 x 0.3 cm
Weight
0.15 kg.
ISBN13
9781501044687

General Creighton Abrams and the Operational Approach of Attrition in the Vietnam War

U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col (Author) · Createspace Independent Publishing Platform · Paperback

General Creighton Abrams and the Operational Approach of Attrition in the Vietnam War - U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

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Origin: U.S.A. (Import costs included in the price)
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Synopsis "General Creighton Abrams and the Operational Approach of Attrition in the Vietnam War"

This book proposes that the United States Armed Forces consistently followed a strategy of attrition from the introduction of battalion sized combat troops in 1965, through the Westmoreland-Abrams transition, and ultimately encouraged the South Vietnamese to follow this strategy during the period of Vietnamization. General Abrams promoted a "one-war" strategy which had the desired end state of population security for the people of South Vietnam. In reality the "one-war" was a multi-tiered strategy of attrition. The training of South Vietnamese forces was predicated on their capability to conduct attrition warfare upon the departure of American forces. This book emphasizes the continuity of American strategy in the Republic of South Vietnam. Despite claims of a radical shift to counter-insurgency and pacification operations, General Abrams continued a consistent strategy he inherited from his predecessor; in turn he passed it on to the South Vietnamese. Any limited success achieved by the United States Armed Forces in South Vietnam was a result of attrition not counter-insurgency and that the ultimate failure was the inability to transition from attrition to maneuver.

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