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portada Reform for Sale: A Common Agency Model With Moral Hazard Frictions (Elements in Law, Economics and Politics)
Type
Physical Book
Language
Inglés
Pages
75
Format
Paperback
Dimensions
22.9 x 15.2 x 0.5 cm
Weight
0.13 kg.
ISBN13
9781009285582

Reform for Sale: A Common Agency Model With Moral Hazard Frictions (Elements in Law, Economics and Politics)

Perrin Lefebvre (Author) · David Martimort (Author) · Cambridge University Press · Paperback

Reform for Sale: A Common Agency Model With Moral Hazard Frictions (Elements in Law, Economics and Politics) - Lefebvre, Perrin ; Martimort, David

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Origin: U.S.A. (Import costs included in the price)
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Synopsis "Reform for Sale: A Common Agency Model With Moral Hazard Frictions (Elements in Law, Economics and Politics)"

Lobbying competition is viewed as a delegated common agency game under moral hazard. Several interest groups try to influence a policy-maker who exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. With no restriction on the space of contribution schedules, all equilibria perfectly reflect the principals' preferences over alternatives. As a result, lobbying competition reaches efficiency. Unfortunately, such equilibria require that the policy-maker pays an interest group when the latter is hurt by the reform. When payments remain non-negative, inducing effort requires leaving a moral hazard rent to the decision maker. Contributions schedules no longer reflect the principals' preferences, and the unique equilibrium is inefficient. Free-riding across congruent groups arises and the set of groups active at equilibrium is endogenously derived. Allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus are linked altogether and both depend on the set of active principals, as well as on the group size.

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